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The Investment Cost of Following Islamic Laws
OmarAl-Shakfa
This study examines the extent to which imposing constraints on a portfolio
diminishes its return. I look at the cost of observance of Islamic laws (Sharia), which
restrict the composition of portfolios according to the activities of companies and their
financial ratios. Cross-sectional regressions of monthly risk-adjusted S&P 500 stock
returns on a variety of company characteristics reveal that individual mean returns are
significantly related to industry membership but not to the various Islamic compliance
criteria. This is further supported by spanning tests which suggest that an Islamic index
can be considered a substitute for the overall Secular index. However, randomly selected
Islamic-compliant portfolios of various sizes tend under-perform their risk-matched
Secular counterparts in-sample. And while out-of-sample performance turns against
Secular portfolios, this is attributable largely to investment in Financials by the latter.
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1 . Introduction
Islam is a religion that teaches both the spiritual and temporal aspects of life. It
provides guidance to people on their relationship with God and their behaviour in
everyday social and economic settings. It is the only major religion that has a set of laws,
Sharia, that deals with the private and public aspects of life, things ranging from
sexuality, family, and hygiene, to business, banking, economics, and politics. These laws
are based upon interpretations of the Quran and the Sunnah.
The application of Sharia in business and finance is not a recent phenomenon.
During the Islamic golden age (8th to 12th centuries), a number of innovative practices
arose, including limited partnerships [mudaraba), early forms of capital and capital
accumulation, promissory notes, cheques, and trusts. The principles of that early system
were based mainly on the sharing ofprofit and loss and the prohibition of usury {riba).
As Muslim societies developed, with their financial needs becoming more
complex, the Islamic financial system was gradually replaced by a conventional one
based on interest. The post golden age can be viewed as a time of stagnation in Islamic
financial thought. But the growing desire of Muslims today to reconcile modern finance
with their religious beliefs has led to a new and rapid growth in Islamic investment
practices [Elfakhani, Hassan, and Sidani (2005)]. At the heart of this reconciliation are
voluntary restrictions on investment choice, and the issue addressed in this study is
1 Sayings of the prophet Mohammad (pbnp).
1
whether those restrictions disadvantage Muslim equity investors. Is there a cost of
observance?
As a practical matter, portfolios are always formed from far fewer assets than are
available in a given market. Portfolio theory [Markowitz (1952)] tells us that portfolios
comprised of all available assets dominate those formed of any subset. But the relative
performance of portfolios that are formed from different subsets of all available assets is
necessarily an empirical question. Self-imposed restrictions on investment choice for
religious or ethical reasons may or may not result in performance that is poorer than that
which is unrestricted. This study provides evidence on this by measuring the cost of
observance and examining which restrictions, if any, affects performance. I find that
Islamic investment criteria bear no significant relation to the mean returns on individual
S&P 500 stocks when industry sector is taken into account. Furthermore, spanning tests
suggest that an index of Islamic-compliant stocks is effectively a substitute for an index
of Secular stocks. However, randomly selected Islamic portfolios comprised of various
numbers of stocks are dominated by their risk-matched Secular counterparts' in-sample.
And a reversal of the performance difference that is observed out-of-sample is largely
attributable to Secular investment in Financials and the period under study. It may be,
therefore, that "the effects of restrictions on choice are not discernable at the level of
individual stocks or large indices, but are discernible in portfolios that contain the small
number of stocks that is most typical. Given that there are currently multiple Islamic
investment compliance standards, with no universal standard to be expected for some
time, and that Islamic investors appear willing to re-examine their rules of investment,
the evidence presented here contributes to that deliberation.
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2. Historical Backgroud
The first Islamic bank, a project pioneered by the economist Ahmad El Najjar,
began operating in the Egyptian town of Mit Ghamr in 1963. It downplayed its Islamic
image to avoid possible public perception of associations with Islamic fundamentalism.
It operated much like a credit union, engaging in trade and sharing profits with its
depositors. Within four years, there were nine similar banks in the country but Mit
Ghamr bank had since stopped operating [Siddiqi (1988)]. Nasser Social Bank was
established in 1971 as a revival of the Mit Ghamr institution, headed again by Dr. El
Najjar. It was affiliated with the Ministry of the Treasury and had the financial support
of the government. The bank formed under the socialist regime of the time: "In a society
of 'sufficiency and justice', believing that work is the main foundation of society...
capital has, above all, a social function, and should be freed from any suspicion of
exploitation or injustice. This it has been decided to replace the principle of interest with
a principle of 'partnership' " [Atiyya, (1987:33-34)].
Following the decline of the "Nasser socialism" 2 and the oil boom in the Arab
world, both in the early 1970's, Egypt started to promote the idea of Islamic banking
internationally. The Nasser social bank would become the organizational model for
Islamic banks that emerged in the Arab world. 3 The mid 1970s then marked the
2 Arab nationalist political ideology based on the thinking of former Egyptian president Gamal Abdel
Nasser. It had a strong influence on pan-Arab politics in the 1950s and 1960s.
3 Nazih N.M. Ayubi, Political Islam (181-182).
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beginning of a growth period for Islamic banks: the first private bank, Dubai Islamic
Bank; the Saudi-based Faisal Islamic Bank with branches in Egypt, Sudan, and Jordan;
and Kuwait Finance House and the Islamic Bank of Bahrain doing business outside the
Muslim world.
Since the 1990s, Islamic financial assets have been averaging a ten to 15 percent
growth rate [Tutton (2009)], and are expected to grow at this rate for several years to
come [The Daily Star Regional, 2008]. There are some 300 Islamic financial institutions
in more than 51 countries, accounting for more than $900 billion in shari'a-compliant
investments [Lindsay (2010)]. Western financial centres have begun taking a closer look
at Islamic finance in the aftermath of the subprime loan crisis, and the University of
Reading's Heanley in Britain has even started a master's program in investment banking
and Islamic finance [Gardiner (2009)].
3. The Fundamentals of Islamic Investment
Islam encourages labour, trade, and the sharing of profit and loss. It forbids riba,
maysir (games of chance or gambling) and gharar (trading in highly speculative assets
and short selling). Insurance and financial derivatives are gharar. Most Islamic scholars
and jurists are opposed to them.
Islam condemns severely those three sins as put clearly in the Quran: "Those who
eat riba will not stand (on the day of resurrection) except like the standing of a person
beaten by Shaitan (Satan) leading him to insanity. That is because they say: Trading is
only like riba, whereas Allah has permitted trading and forbidden riba" (2:275); "Allah
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will destroy riba and will give increase for sadaqat (deeds of charity)" (2:276); "O people
of faith: Wine, gambling, dedications of stones, and divination with arrows are
abominable works of the devil. Thus, avoid such activities so you may prosper" (5:90).4
Additionally, the prophet Mohammad was narrated for the following: "The Prophet
{pbuh) has forbidden the purchase of the unborn animal in its mother's womb, the sale of
the milk in the udder without measurement, the purchase of spoils of war prior to their
distribution, the purchase of charities prior to their receipt, and the purchase of the catch
of a diver."5
Islamic teachings draw a distinction between legitimate labour income and
interest income. Riba is forbidden for these reasons:
1 . A dollar equals a dollar. Money cannot grow without human effort.
2. Usury tempts people away from real labour. Earning interest instead of
working makes people less productive.
3. Usury represents an unhealthy self-interest. Charging the poor interest
destroys our sense of humanity and willingness to cooperate or help others.
4. Charging interest is usually a transfer of wealth from the poor to the rich that
increases economic inequality.
Islam also sets limits on the investment in companies that contradict its values. No
investment can be made in companies that engage in activities involving liquor, pork-
related products, gambling, pornography, and conventional financial services.
English translation of the Quran.
Narrated by Ahmad and Ibn Majah on the authority of Abu-Said Alkhudriy. Source: Academy for
International Modern Studies (AIMS), www.learning Islamicfinance.com.
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Like socially responsible investments (SRIs), Islamic portfolios must satisfy
certain criteria. Although Muslims follow the same teachings, the Quran and the Sunnah
(learnings of the prophet), there is no consensus on the criteria that constitutes Islamic
compliance for modern investments. That is because the Quran dates back to the seventh
century. Today, it is Islamic scholars who come up with investment rules based on
Ijtihad, which is the process of making legal decisions by independent interpretation of
the Quran and the Sunnah.
Those rules are drafted and agreed upon by committees of Muslim scholars called
Sharia boards. They are generally scholars of high repute with extensive experience in
law, economics, banking systems and finance as prescribed by Islamic Sharia. They work
together, sometimes in consultation with other religious scholars, to ensure that each
fatwa (a ruling on Islamic principle) is in accordance with Islamic principles. Once the
fatwa or set offatwas is made, it is communicated to financial institutions. Thereafter, the
board supervises institutions to ensure compliance. The Sharia board is important for the
image of any Islamic bank, since their Muslim clientele will refer to the fatwas of the
board for their financial decisions. Any deviance from those rulings that are made public
could severely damage a bank's reputation. The board also plays an informal marketing
function by participating in conferences and publishing studies about compliant financial
products offered by the institution.
The existence of so many Sharia boards makes it difficult to agree upon common
fatwas. Differences in the interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah can completely
change the way Muslims invest their money. In fact, a few Islamic scholars have
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opposed any investment in the capital markets. They believe that those markets are based
on pure speculation and gharar. They instead prefer investments in the real asset markets
through a set of Islamic investment contracts such as mark-up credit sales (murabaha),
lease financing {ijara) and mudaraba. Another group of scholars sees no harm in stock
market investment, however, subject to strict constraints to exclude companies whose
activities are considered haram (forbidden). The latter can be problematic when only a
minuscule part of a company's business is haram [ Al-Kurdi. A. (1998)].
Nevertheless, the majority of Islamic scholars agree that investment in the stocks
is acceptable if the company's activities are hallal (permissible). If an otherwise
compliant company deals with riba, then its assets must be evaluated to ensure that its
debt does not exceed one-third of its market capitalization . This consensus of scholars is
found to be the most accepted and followed by Islamic mutual funds. Muslims are
advised that they can invest in businesses that satisfy the following conditions:
• The business must not violate Shari 'a. No investment can be made in companies
that engage in unlawful activities such as liquor, gambling and pornography.
• If the principal business activity is acceptable, but the company engages in
interest-related activities, shareholders must express their disapproval for such
dealings wherever possible.
• Income generated from dividends should be purified of riba activities. This is
done through the allocation of a percentage ofthat dividend to charities in
proportion to the income generated from interest-related activities.
The reasoning behind this specific ratio is the prophetic saying: "The third is significant", concerning the
restricting voluntary distribution of estate in a will to a maximum of one third of the estate.
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• Shares of companies are only negotiable if the business has real assets. Shares of
companies whose assets are financial can only be traded at par value.
A small number of Islamic academics believe that as long as the core business of
the company is hallal, then the amount of debt shouldn't be of any importance as long as
this burden doesn't harm stakeholders (such as employees being laid off due to financial
distress from excessive borrowing or decreasing value of the firm). Unlike secular
portfolios, Islamic portfolios cannot include debt instruments, and are therefore deprived
of bonds or any sort of fixed-income security. Additionally, Islamic portfolios must pass
through the screening criteria discussed previously. These will be stated more
specifically in the Methods section.
4. Previous Research on Islamic and Ethical Investments
Girard and Hassan (2008) study the performance of FTSE Islamic indices and
compare them to their secular counterparts. In order to evaluate any possible cost of
faith-based investing, they use three methodologies: risk-reward performance via the
CAPM alpha, Sharpe and Treynor ratios; performance under Carhart's four-factor pricing
model; and lastly, multivariate co-integration analysis. No significant difference in
performance of Islamic and secular indices other than that which can be attributed to
differences in investment style was found. Islamic indices were found to be growth- and
small-cap oriented while secular indices lean towards value and mid-cap stocks. Girard
and Hassan believe this is because of exclusion of value sectors with high environmental
risks.
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Derigs and Marzban (2009) proposed a new paradigm for Sharia compliance
whereby the criteria are applied to portfolios rather than the stocks contained in them.
This necessarily increases choice as companies that have non-compliant debt levels taken
individually can be included in a portfolio if the debt level of all of its stocks combined is
acceptable. The approach has yet to be approved by a Sharia board or council of boards.
Derigs and Marzban compare the performance of Islamic portfolios under the most
widely used compliance criteria with that of secular portfolios and find that the most
liberal screens tend to result in portfolios with comparatively better performance.
While there is considerable research on Islamic banking, very little has been done
on Islamic portfolio management. However, the question raised by socially responsible
investment (SRI, also called ethical investment), where compliance with chosen social
interests or causes, such as gender equality, civil rights, the environment, labour rights,
and support of local communities, is a condition of investment is exactly the same as that
faced by Muslim investors: Does restriction on choice result in poorer (or different)
portfolio performance? Drhymes (1998) found, through an analysis of variance, that the
annual cross section of stock returns for 1991 through 1996 is generally significantly
associated with IBES sector membership but either insignificant or inconsistent year to
year for various SRI criteria. Statman (2000) found that the Domini Social Index
outperformed the S&P 500 Index in raw returns but underperformed it (insignificantly) in
risk-adjusted returns. SRI funds outperformed conventional funds when both were
controlled for asset size but again the difference was insignificant. Sauer (1997) found
much the same in comparing the performance of the Domini 400 Social Index to the S&P
500 and the CRSP value weighted market index. He found that the cost of social
9
constraints is negligible when measuring performance with respect to Jensen's alpha and
Sharpe ratios.
The lack of any substantial difference between ethical and conventional mutual
fund performance extends internationally. Bauer, Koedijk and Otten (2004) found no
significant difference in the CAPM and Carhart four-factor model risk-adjusted returns
for Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. They found that ethical funds
are less exposed to market risk and tend to be more growth-oriented; ethical funds in the
United States invest more in large caps, while those of the United Kingdom and Germany
are more exposed to small caps.
The evidence suggests that SRI and conventional indices may be substitutes for
one another. Schroder (2006) focuses solely on the performance of SRI indices,
eliminating therefore the need to take into consideration mutual fund management
variables. He also employs a spanning test to determine if Jensen's alpha and the beta
coefficient from a regression of SRI indices' returns versus benchmark returns are jointly
equal to zero and one. SRI indices neither outperform nor underperform their
benchmarks. He also finds that 28% of the SRI indices could be replicated by their
conventional benchmarks.
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5. Data and Methods
5.1 Data
The sample is current members of the S&P 500. Monthly price data for the ten-
year period January, 1999 through December, 2008 were collected from Bloomberg.
Companies were identified by their Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB)
membership. Monthly market capitalization, total debt, cash and cash equivalents, and
accounts receivables were also obtained from Bloomberg and used to compute averages
for each year from January, 1998 to determine compliance with Islamic financial criteria
as described below. This dataset was formed to allow compliance screen annually. A
stock was deemed compliant in a given year if it passed all screens in the previous year.
5.2 Compliance Screening
Sharia compliance was determined according to the Guide to the Islamic Dow
Jones Islamic Market Indexes, which is the rulebook developed by the Dow Jones Islamic
Market Indexes supervisory board, a group of Muslim scholars from different countries,
for the DJIM. Index members are reviewed quarterly for compliance. Compliant
companies cannot be involved in business having to do with alcohol, tobacco, pork-
related products, financial services, weapons and defence, and entertainment (movies,
hotels, casinos, pornography, bars, music, etc.). Compliance is determined by ICB sector
as presented in Table 1. Since it is difficult to screen for companies involved with pork-
related products or alcohol, the guidebook suggest to refrain from investing in any food-
related business. That includes producers, retailers, wholesalers, and restaurants.
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Table 1
Islamic Non-compliant ICB Sectors
ICB Code ICB Sector
2717 Defence
3533 Brewers




5337 Food Retailers & Wholesalers





5757 Restaurants & Bars
8355 Banks
8532 Full Line Insurance
8534 Insurance Brokers
8536 Property & Casualty Insurance
8538 Reinsurance
8575 Life Insurance





Companies must also pass a financial screen. The 12-month averages for total
debt, cash and interest-bearing securities, and accounts receivable cannot exceed one-
third of the 12-month average market capitalization in any a given year. These financial
screens are an attempt to ensure that a company is mostly involved in real rather than
financial activities, but they are nonetheless controversial as compliance is affected by
market conditions. Table 2 reports that in the year 2000, 202 companies were identified
as Islamic compliant and 425 as Secular (223 non-complaint plus 202 Islamic).
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Table 2
Establishing the Islamic-Compliant and Secular Samples
Screen Number ofco panies
S&P 500 500




Removed companies with other forbidden activities 41
Removed companies with financial ratios above 33% 121
Islamic-compliant sample 202
Tables 3 and 4 report the number of constraints violated by non-compliant companies
and the frequency with which each constraint results in non-compliance. Most
companies violate one, and being in the financial services sector or having a high debt
ratio constitutes two-thirds of the violations.
Table 3
Number of Constraints Violated Per Company






Number of Times a Violation Occurred







Cash ratio > 33%
Debt ratio > 33%










5.3 Profile of companies
Islamic companies are more highly represented in healthcare and technology, and
of course, completely absent from the financial sector. Figure 1 shows histograms of
sector membership for the Islamic and Secular companies and the subset of Secular
companies that are non-compliant. Except for the complete exclusion from the financial
sector, Islamic companies are present in all others, although telecommunications and
utilities are distinctly under-represented.
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Figure 1
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The left scale is the weight of every industry. The bars show the average weights in each industry
for 3 portfolios. Three portfolios are compared over the entire 10 years period as portfolios are
rebalanced on an annual basis.
5.4 Cross-Sectional Regressions
I follow Dhrymes (1998) and regress the average monthly return for each
company in a given year, y„ on two sets of dummy variables. The first set, Xj, is
comprised of the eight compliance criteria (tobacco, alcohol, pork, weapons and defence,
entertainment, debt, cash, accounts receivable), where 1 denotes violation and 0
compliance, and a ninth indicator for overall Islamic-compliance (1 for true, 0 false). The
second set of dummy variables, D, identifies membership in nine of the ten ICB sectors
(Oil and Gas, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Goods, Healthcare, Consumer Services,
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Telecommunications, Financials, Technology). The intercept represents the average
return on Islamic-compliant companies in the Utilities sector.
y,- = (X0+ Dj=i ßj Xj + Dk=j Yk Dk + u,-
The estimated coefficients ofX represent the incremental average monthly return
associated with the violation of any one of the compliance criteria, while the estimated
coefficients of D gauge the incremental return associated with sector membership. The
regressions are run for our sample of S&P500 companies and each of the ten years.
5.5 Risk-matched Portfolios
No portfolio includes all stocks available in a given market. The relevant
question is whether portfolios formed of fewer stocks than are available but otherwise
chosen freely from the whole set perform differently from those with the same number of
stocks but whose composition is restricted to the subset that is compliant with Sharia. To
make this comparison so that it is not affected by the investment ability or timing of fund
managers, I randomly selected 1 00 portfolios from the subset of 202 S&P Islamic stocks
and compared the return of each to a risk-matched portfolio that is randomly selected
from among all 425 Secular stocks. That exercise was repeated for portfolios of five, 10,
15, 20, and 25 stocks.
For each randomly selected pair of portfolios, a risk target was set equal to the standard
deviation that the Islamic portfolio would have if its stocks were included with equal
weights. Based on this risk target the efficient unconstrained and constrained (no short
positions) mean-variance weights were computed [Markowitz (1952)], allowing
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comparison of their expected returns for a seven-year estimation or in-sample period,
2000 through 2006 (84 monthly observations). The portfolios were then tracked for the
two years immediately following.
5.6 Spanning Test7
In addition to the direct comparison of risk-matched portfolios, I performed a
spanning test by regressing monthly returns of a value-weighted index formed from the
subset of stocks that are Islamic-compliant in 1998 on a value-weighted index of the
entire set of Secular stocks. This index was rebalanced every year to include newly
compliant stocks or exclude stocks that had become non-compliant.
Performance was assessed by a simple linear regression and comparison of
means. The spanning test is the test of the joint null hypothesis that the intercept of the
regression is zero and the slope coefficient is one. A failure to reject the null hypothesis
is evidence in support of the Islamic index being a substitute for the Secular index, and
therefore allowing Islamic investors to effectively replicate portfolios that are enjoyed by
Secular investors [Schroder (2007)]. As in Huberman and Kandel (1987), I test whether
the minimum-variance frontier of the Islamic index coincides with that if its benchmark.
Typically the indices used in spanning tests come from non-intersecting sets of assets. In my case, the
Islamic index is a subset of the Secular index, and it might be thought that the slope coefficient in the
regression is necessarily equal to one. This is not so. The coefficient is equal to the covariance of the two
indices divided by the variance of the Secular index, which is the independent variable. It will equal one
only if the covariance is equal to the variance; and while the covariance does converge to the variance if the
number of assets in the subset portfolio is increased so that it approaches the total in the Secular set, for any
fewer, it is an empirical question.
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6. Results and Discussion
6.1 Cross-sectional Average Monthly Returns
There is no consistent or significant association between the average monthly
returns of stocks and the compliance criteria. Table 4 summaries the ten cross-sectional
regressions of average monthly returns on the Islamic compliance criteria and sector
membership for each year, 1999 through 2008. The table reports the R-squared for each
regression and identifies which variables were significant and their signs. Details of the
estimates are in Appendix 1. These variables explain between seven and 37% of the
cross-sectional variation in returns. It can be seen that in most years only sector
membership matters, and this itself varies, as would be expected, from year to year
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6.2 Comparison of Individual Stocks Based on Violation or Non-Violation
For six of the ten years, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the mean return on
Islamic stocks is different from that of Secular stocks. For the other four years the null is
rejected, twice in favour of Secular stocks and twice in favour of Islamic. Table 6
summaries t-tests for differences in means based on different sample sizes across all ten
years.
Table 6


















































This supports the cross-sectional regression, suggesting that individual Islamic-compliant
stocks cannot be said to perform differently from non-compliant stocks.
6.3 Performance of Risk-Matched Portfolios
When randomly selected, constrained portfolios are risk matched, Secular
portfolios are found to dominate Islamic portfolios across all size classes for the
estimation period. The Secular portfolios outperform the Islamic portfolios by
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approximately 20 to 30 basis points per month, and the null hypothesis of equal mean
returns is rejected in all cases. Table 7 summaries the performance comparison for the
in-sample. Both the mean and quartiles of the differences (Secular minus Islamic) in
expected returns are stated in basis points. The column headed Secular shows the
number of outperforming Secular portfolios that contain at least one non-compliant stock,
no matter how small the investment, and the column headed Islamic shows the number of
outperforming Islamic portfolios that were pitted against a Secular portfolio with at least
one non-compliant stock in it. The differences between the two columns show that if a
Secular portfolio has any non-complaint stocks in it, it is more likely to dominate than be
dominated. Finally, the last column reports the correlation coefficient of between the
difference in expected return and the fraction that the Secular portfolio is invested in non-
compliant stocks.
Table 7
In-Sample Performance of Risk-Matched Portfolios
Portfolio size Matched Difference p-value Quartiles Secular Islamic Correlation
5 stocks 84 23 0.004 -32,26,84 47 27 Ö7T6
10 stocks 97 23 0.00014 -11,27,65 65 28 0.11
15 stocks 100 29 0 -9,28,64 67 32 0.08
20 stocks 100 31 0 -2,32,63 71 28 0.19
25 stocks 100 31 0 -2,32,63 72 28 -0.19
The column headed Matched is the number of successful risk matches out of 1 00 random draws of pairs of portfolios
of the given number of stocks. Difference is the difference in mean return in basis points (Secular minus Islamic). A
positive difference means that Secular portfolios have a higher expected return on average. P-values are reported for
t-tests of the mean difference across all portfolios in the given size class. Qi4artiles shows the 25' , 50' and 75'
percentiles of the difference in expected return. The column headed Secular shows the number of outperforming
Secular portfolios that with an investment in at least one non-compliant stock. The column headed Islamic shows the
number of outperforming Islamic portfolios that were pitted against a Secular portfolio with an investment in at least
one non-compliant stock. The last column, Correlation, show the correlation coefficient between Difference and the
total percentage invested in non-compliant stocks by the Secular portfolio.
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In general, Secular portfolios are expected to do better when they include a higher
proportion of non-compliant stocks. This is further supported when we look at the
industries in which both Islamic and Secular portfolios invest. Islamic portfolios tend to
invest in only seven out of the ten ICB sectors. Financials and utilities are two industries
completely passed over by Islamic portfolios due to their non-compliance with Sharia',
while telecommunications is a negligible investment in both Islamic and Secular
portfolios. In all, the compositions of both sets of portfolios differ greatly (Appendix 2).
Islamic portfolios would appear to be disadvantaged by this reduced diversity of choice.
In fact, about 70% of the Islamic investments are locked in three sectors: health care,
industrials, and consumer goods.
When the performance of the portfolios is tracked out of sample for two years,
2007 and 2008, the Secular advantage largely disappears. The average difference in
mean returns (Secular minus Islamic) is now -25 basis points, although it is insignificant
for all but the 20 stocks size class.
Table 8
Out-of-Sample Performance of Risk-Matched Portfolios
No. of Difference P-Value Quarliles Top Return Less Risk
stocks '¦___________Return S.d. Return S.d. Return S.d. Secular Islamic Secular Islamic
5 -22 107 0.322 0.013 -102,3,102 237,51,-89 44 40 31 53
10 -29 79 0.111 0.004 -141,-23,51 195,24,-60 41 56 38 59
15 -9 85 0.612 0.010 -78,5,112 192,39,-98 51 49 37 63
20 -48 61 0.004 0.009 -136,-27,59 183,41,-74 37 63 42 58
25 -5 -24 0.783 0.415 -126,8,90 195,59,-146 51 49 41 59
The same portfolios constructed at the beginning of the in-sample period are kept for two years and their performance
compared. The difference in returns and standard deviations (s.d.) between the averages of the Secular portfolios and
the averages of the Islamic portfolios are calculated and presented in basis points. A negative difference in return
indicates underperforming Secular portfolios on average. A positive difference in standard deviation indicates that
Secular portfolios re riskier on average. The number of top performing portfolios in term of risk and return for each
set in the last set of columns.
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This situation is due to the difference in the composition of the two sets of
portfolios. As the pie charts in Appendix 2 indicate, Islamic portfolios do not include any
investments in financiáis, a sector that was severely hit during the two out-of-sample
years (2007 and 2008). This is illustrated in Table 9. The bigger the investment in
financiáis, the more that Secular portfolios suffer. This is consistent across size classes.
However, we can see that if we look at every portfolio individually, we find that the
probability of a secular portfolio to come on top is close to the one where an Islamic
portfolio outperforms. When we pick an Islamic portfolio over a secular one, chances to
outperform or to underperform are similar. This portfolio is nevertheless, more likely to
be less risky than the secular portfolio.
Table 9
Investment in Financials by Secular Portfolios and Mean Difference in Return
Secular Mean Difference in Mean Return By Number ofStocks in the Portfolio
Weight in 5 Stocks 10 Stocks 15 Stocks 20 Stocks 25 Stocks
Financials
5% -1.08% -0.98% -1.31% -0.88% -0.89%
>0% -1.94% -1.46% -1.71% -1.55% -1.41%
>20% -1.82% -1.61% -1.81% -1.80% -1.97%
> 50% -2.36% -2.12% -2.25% -2.39% -2.30%
Difference in mean return is Secular minus Islamic, 2000-2008, for 24 months.
6.4 Spanning Test
The spanning test provides evidence as to whether one index can be taken as a
substitute for another. The mean return on a value-weighted index of all 202 Islamic
stocks is 0.0217%, and that of all 425 Secular stocks, -0.021 1%, for the period 1999-2008
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(119 observations). The null hypothesis that they are equal cannot be rejected (t-stat =
0.367). This suggests that there is no difference in performance between the two indices.
A regression of the returns of the Islamic index on the Secular index produces an
R-squared of 94%. Following Schroder (2007), the null hypothesis that the intercept is
equal to zero and that the slope coefficient is equal to one cannot be rejected when
conducted separately, and neither can the joint null hypothesis. This supports the
substitutability of the Islamic index for the Secular index; however, as the results on risk-
matched portfolios shows, this may not be realized in the performance of smaller
portfolios.
Table 10
Results of the Spanning Test
______Tes£ T-Stat F-Value P-Value
H0: (X=O 0.372 0.139 0.7103
?0:ß=1 0.903 0.816 0.368
?0:ß=1&a=0 : 0.476 0-623




In this paper, I examined the investment cost that Muslim investors bear when
choosing to be observant with their religion. Cross sectional regression of mean returns
and spanning tests do not reveal a cost at the level of individual stocks or for entire
indices. However, Islamic portfolios, containing what would be considered a typical
number of stocks do under-perform their risk-matched Secular counterparts in-sample,
and out-performance in a forecast period is largely attributable to specific events
affecting Secular portfolios with at least some investment in Financials.
Nevertheless, we should keep on mind that our study looked only at the cost of
compliance from a purely equity perspective. We might be underestimating the cost by
excluding debt-bearing securities. In that regard, it is noteworthy to look at Sukuks






















14 Weapons and Defence
1 5 Entertainment-Related
1 6 Cash/market cap ratio > 33%
1 7 Debt/market cap ratio > 33%
1 8 Accounts Receivables ratio > 33%













































































Ordinary least squares cross-sectional regression of mean monthly return for 1999 on dummy variables for
Industry Classification Benchmark sector (variables 2-10), Islamic compliance criteria (variables 11-18) and
whether the company is Islamic-compliant (19). The intercept represents non-compliant companies in the
Utilities sector. N = 341 companies. R-square = 0.378, Adjusted R-squared = 0.344.
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1 Intercept -1701.228 1024.840 -1.660
2 Oil & Gas 4279.037 963.171 4.443
3 Materials 2467.291 1106.524 2.230
4 Industrials 1160.664 872.106 1.331
5 Consumer Goods -381.990 971.894 -.393
6 HealthCare 1832.221 962.482 1.904
7 Consumer Services 331.158 974.166 .340
8 Telecommunications 1985.372 1852.308 1.072
9 Financials 1325.781 975.092 1.360
10 Technology 6787.711 950.941 7.138
11 Alcohol-Related -1260.235 1840.521 -.685
12 Tobacco-Related -2802.347 3591.237 -.780
13 Pork-Related 1030.871 1116.555 .923
14 Weapons and Defence -1393.099 1528.674 -.911
15 Entertainment-Related 2936.307 1532.222 1.916
16 Cash/market cap ratio > 33% 444.660 794.701 .560
17 Debt/market cap ratio > 33% 2012.168 1503.403 1.338
18 Accounts Receivables ratio > 33% 808.768 829.025 .976




















Ordinary least squares cross-sectional regression ofmean monthly return for 2000 on dummy variables for
Industry Classification Benchmark sector (variables 2-10), Islamic compliance criteria (variables 11-18) and
whether the company is Islamic-compliant (19). The intercept represents non-compliant companies in the
Utilities sector. N = 425 companies, R-square = 0.267, Adjusted R-squared = 0.236.
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1 Intercept -1604.032 622.435 -2.577
2 Oil & Gas 436.752 646.045 .676
3 Materials 2278.050 697.649 3.265
4 Industrials 2101.245 558.057 3.765
5 Consumer Goods 2502.768 601.761 4.159
6 HealthCare 2169.600 646.828 3.354
7 Consumer Services 3589.902 622.791 5.764
8 Telecommunications -165.167 1052.486 -.157
9 Financials 1185.624 569.937 2.080
10 Technology 2178.568 626.992 3.475
11 Alcohol-Related -237.288 1020.994 -.232
12 Tobacco-Related -542.538 1840.388 -.295
13 Pork-Related -1069.545 661.318 -1.617
14 Weapons and Defence 3011.101 1090.273 2.762
15 Entertainment-Related -1929.126 972.558 -1.984
16 Cash/market cap ratio > 33% -479.598 598.425 -.801
17 Debt/market cap ratio > 33% 668.428 445.126 1.502
18 Accounts Receivables ratio > 33% 846.821 402.771 2.102




















Ordinary least squares cross-sectional regression of mean monthly return for 2001 on dummy variables for
Industry Classification Benchmark sector (variables 2-10), Islamic compliance criteria (variables 11-18) and
whether the company is Islamic-compliant (19). The intercept represents non-compliant companies in the
Utilities sector. N = 445 companies, R-square = 0.155, Adjusted R-squared = 0.1 19.
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1 Intercept -1625.957 571.860 -2.843
2 Oil&Gas 1435.515 571.267 2.513
3 Materials 1301.261 627.102 2.075
4 Industrials 1447.396 509.979 2.838
5 Consumer Goods 1704.212 549.707 3.100
6 HealthCare 910.567 580.960 1.567
7 Consumer Services 1401.390 570.106 2.458
8 Telecommunications 1903.976 945.324 2.014
9 Financials 898.425 499.704 1.798
10 Technology 368.356 561.240 .656
11 Alcohol-Related 277.570 925.040 .300
12 Tobacco-Related -858.918 1705.115 -.504
13 Pork-Related -329.869 570.400 -.578
14 Weapons and Defence 1035.892 984.423 1.052
15 Entertainment-Related -1101.913 894.062 -1.232
16 Cash/market cap ratio > 33% -2.307 488.727 -.005
17 Debt/market cap ratio > 33% 263.351 410.421 .642
18 Accounts Receivables ratio > 33% -795.653 403.134 -1.974




















Ordinary least squares cross-sectional regression of mean monthly return for 2002 on dummy variables for
Industry Classification Benchmark sector (variables 2-10), Islamic compliance criteria (variables 1 1-18) and
whether the company is Islamic-compliant ( 1 9). The intercept represents non-compliant companies in the
Utilities sector. N = 455 companies, R-square = 0.068, Adjusted R-squared = 0.038.
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2 Oil & Gas 788.282
3 Materials 1646.512
4 Industrials 1035.192
5 Consumer Goods 609.367
6 Healthcare 1343.288







1 4 Weapons and Defence -1913.535
15 Entertainment-Related -790.333
1 6 Cash/market cap ratio > 33% 1 685.475
17 Debt/market cap ratio > 33% 181.348
1 8 Accounts Receivables ratio > 33% 69 1 .401
19 Company is Compliant -847.782
Ordinary least squares cross-sectional regression of mean monthly return for 2003 on dummy variables for
Industry Classification Benchmark sector (variables 2-10), Islamic compliance criteria (variables 1 1-18) and
whether the company is Islamic-compliant (19). The intercept represents non-compliant companies in the


































































Oil & Gas 2002.657 429.199
Materials 1634.376 477.378
Industrials 748.400 383.504
Consumer Goods 760.551 415.766
HealthCare 909.161 430.937







Weapons and Defence 320.345 758.503
Entertainment-Related -985.793 612.870
Cash/market cap ratio > 33% 392.790 29 1 .540
Debt/market cap ratio > 33% 273.955 285.465
Accounts Receivables ratio > 33% 349.620 274. 100





















Ordinary least squares cross-sectional regression of mean monthly return for 2004 on dummy variables for
Industry Classification Benchmark sector (variables 2-10), Islamic compliance criteria (variables 1 1-18) and
whether the company is Islamic-compliant (19). The intercept represents non-compliant companies in the










































Cross-Sectional Regression Estimates for 2005
Variable Coefficient Standard t-value p-value
Error
1 Intercept 1806.655 436.099 4.143 .000
2 Oil & Gas 2803.155 466.908 6.004 .000
3 Materials 494.394 512.098 .965 .335
4 Industriais -118.027 406.056 -.291 .771
5 Consumer Goods -982.394 438.074 -2.243 .025
6 HealthCare 378.834 453.367 .836 .404
7 Consumer Services -199.540 451.857 -.442 .659
8 Telecommunications -1268.555 751.518 -1.688 .092
9 Financials -300.650 384.591 -.782 .435
10 Technology 285.636 439.685 .650 .516
11 Alcohol-Related 889.670 688.448 1.292 .197
12 Tobacco-Related 653.770 1337.096 .489 -625
13 Pork-Related -847.673 473.847 -1.789 .074
14 Weapons and Defence -1379.011 816.044 -1.690 .092
15 Entertainment-Related -2458.383 656.394 -3.745 .000
16 Cash/market cap ratio > 33% 363.035 365.186 .994 . .321
17 Debt/market cap ratio > 33% -857.630 296.066 -2.897 .004
18 Accounts Receivables ratio > 33% 262.177 330.091 .794 .427
19 Company is Compliant -1104.584 357.092 -3.093 .002
Ordinary least squares cross-sectional regression of mean monthly return for 2005 on dummy variables for
Industry Classification Benchmark sector (variables 2-10), Islamic compliance criteria (variables 1 1-18) and
whether the company is Islamic-compliant (19). The intercept represents non-compliant companies in the
Utilities sector. N = 472 companies, R-square = 0.227, Adjusted R-squared = 0.196.
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Cross-Sectional Regression Estimates for 2006
Variable Coefficient Standard t-value p-value
Error
1 Intercept 1103.934 358.035 3.083 .002
2 Oil & Gas -408.732 394.058 -1.037 .300
3 Materials 538.689 423.414 1.272 .204
4 Industrials -71.991 332.663 -.216 .829
5 Consumer Goods -440.409 361.249 -1.219 .223
6 HealthCare -739.512 375.616 -1.969 .050
7 Consumer Services -375.722 373.366 -1.006 .315
8 Telecommunications 420.846 584.059 .721 .472
9 Financials 89.370 317.237 .282 .778
10 Technology -240.480 366.074 -.657 .512
11 Alcohol-Related 149.186 566.458 .263 .792
12 Tobacco-Related 1064.026 1100.857 .967 .334
13 Pork-Related 367.126 394.730 .930 .353
14 Weapons and Defence 855.097 670.061 1.276 .203
15 Entertainment-Related 1302.728 536.345 2.429 .016
16 Cash/market cap ratio > 33% 585.010 305.603 1.914 .056
17 Debt/market cap ratio > 33% 106.809 247.081 .432 .666
18 Accounts Receivables ratio > 33% 99.138 287.401 .345 .730
19 Company is Compliant 168.551 298.788 .564 .573
Ordinary least squares cross-sectional regression of mean monthly return for 2006 on dummy variables for
Industry Classification Benchmark sector (variables 2-10), Islamic compliance criteria (variables 11-18) and
whether the company is Islamic-compliant (19). The intercept represents non-compliant companies in the
Utilities sector. N = 470 companies, R-square - 0.066, Adjusted R-squared = 0.029.
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Cross-Sectional Regression Estimates for 2007
Variable Coefficient
1 Intercept












14 Weapons and Defence
1 5 Entertainment-Related
1 6 Cash/market cap ratio > 33%
1 7 Debt/market cap ratio > 33%
1 8 Accounts Receivables ratio > 33%
















































































Ordinary least squares cross-sectional regression of mean monthly return for 2007 on dummy variables for
Industry Classification Benchmark sector (variables 2-10), Islamic compliance criteria (variables 1 1-18) and
whether the company is Islamic-compliant ( 1 9). The intercept represents non-compliant companies in the
Utilities sector. N = 484 companies, R-square = 0.246, Adjusted R-squared = 0.216.
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1 Intercept -1951.035 613.311 -3.181
2 Oil & Gas -1485.802 662.379 -2.243
3 Materials -1743.091 730.335 -2.387
4 Industrials -377.464 566.165 -.667
5 Consumer Goods -255.248 615.971 -.414
6 HealthCare 274.289 626.205 .438
7 Consumer Services -646.338 625.173 -1.034
8 Telecommunications -1051.532 961.137 -1.094
9 Financials -1284.481 555.288 -2.313
10 Technology -1337.564 612.855 -2.183
11 Alcohol-Related -292.170 941.122 -.310
12 Tobacco-Related -808.019 1907.369 -.424
13 Pork-Related 464.216 662.460 .701
14 Weapons and Defence 689.207 1164.190 .592
15 Entertainment-Related -1197.606 880.159 -1.361
16 Cash/market cap ratio > 33% -583.567 548.670 -1.064
17 Debt/market cap ratio > 33% -598.598 430.162 -1.392
18 Accounts Receivables ratio > 33% -1251.118 536.376 -2.333




















Ordinary least squares cross-sectional regression of mean monthly return for 2008 on dummy variables for
Industry Classification Benchmark sector (variables 2-10), Islamic compliance criteria (variables 1 1-18) and
whether the company is Islamic-compliant ( 1 9). The intercept represents non-compliant companies in the
Utilities sector. N = 493 companies, R-square = 0.086, Adjusted R-squared = 0.05 1 .
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Comparison of Individual Stocks Based on Violation or non-Violation
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